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ABSTRACT1 
This paper investigates the politics of holding bank executives accountable for 
banking crises. The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis was 
characterized by a significant variation in the extent to which European 
countries endorsed this type of retributive justice. In particular, while some 
countries established special prosecutorial bodies and took steps to facilitate 
prosecutions, others seemed to consider the crisis “business as usual” and 
relied on the existing investigative and prosecutorial mechanisms to seek out 
wrongdoing. We explore the experiences of two European countries, Iceland 
and Cyprus. We argue that the way a financial crisis unfolds plays a significant 
role in shaping the appetite of politicians for promoting an agenda of 
retributive justice. With a banking collapse, politicians will be most proactive, as 
voters’ demand for justice is high and the risks for the banking industry are 
minimal. With a severe yet negotiated crisis following a bailout/bail-in, politicians 
are more reluctant to endorse policies that may risk the recovery of the fragile 
banking sector.  
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1. Introduction 
More than a decade after the 2008 global financial crisis, the conventional wisdom is that 
impunity prevailed.  In the US no high level bank executives were prosecuted, while in  most 
European countries affected by the crisis such as Ireland or Spain there were only a handful 
of prosecutions. In short, bank executives were off the hook for the bank failures that 
damaged the global economy and affected millions of people. The former Prime Minister of 
the UK, Gordon Brown, lamented the lack of prosecution, stating, “If bankers who act 
fraudulently are not put in jail with their bonuses returned, assets confiscated and banned 
from future practice, we will only give a green light to similar risk-laden behaviour in new 
forms".2 While various researchers have sought to shed light on the extent to which bank 
executives have been held accountable, most explanations have pointed a finger at the 
actions and omissions of prosecutors and noted the special status of banks and their 
executives.3  
This paper takes a different perspective and focuses on the politics of holding bank 
executives accountable after a financial crisis. While politicians are not directly involved in 
prosecuting criminal behavior associated with the onset of the financial crisis, they have 
access to a number of policy tools that facilitate or hinder the prospect of prosecution, such 
as creating special prosecutorial authorities tasked with investigating the possibility of 
criminal behavior behind the bank failures or passing legislative provisions to support 
investigations into potential criminal offenses. However, the extent to which they deployed 
these policy tools in the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession varied significantly across 
 
2 Elliott L (2017) “Gordon Brown: Bankers should have been jailed for role in financial crisis”, The Guardian, 
31 October 2017, also available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/31/gordon-brown-
bankers-should-have-been-jailed-for-role-in-financial-crisis  [last accessed: 15 April 2019] 
3 Garrett, Brandon. Too big to Jail. Harvard University Press, 2014; Eisinger, Jesse. The chickenshit club: Why the 
Justice Department fails to prosecute executives. Simon and Schuster, 2017. 
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countries. For example, in Iceland, politicians established a truth commission which was 
instrumental in shedding light on the patterns of misconduct in the financial industry and 
also created a special prosecutorial authority to bring charges for white-collar crimes 
committed in the run up to the crisis.  Yet in other countries, politicians followed a 
“business as usual” model and relied on conventional mechanisms to investigate offenses 
and bring charges against bank executives. For instance, in Cyprus, politicians set up 
independent commissions of inquiry to document the causes of the crisis, but left the task of 
investigating financial crimes to the existing judicial authorities, despite their limited expertise 
in white-collar crime investigations. Not surprisingly, this curbed the effectiveness of post-
crisis criminal investigations. 
What explains this variation in the degree of political support for retributive4 justice 
in the aftermath of a financial crisis? In our attempt to answer, we focus not on the extent to 
which illegal behavior plays a role in the origins of the crisis but rather on the way a crisis 
unfolds. In particular, we show how the impact of a crisis on the banking sector plays a 
significant role in whetting politicians’ appetite for retributive justice. To be specific, when a 
crisis leaves the existing banking institutions fragile but operational (e.g. after a bailout), 
policymakers are constrained in their capacity to respond to voters’ demands for a proactive 
agenda of accountability, as protracted inquiries or criminal investigations may negatively 
impact public and market confidence in these same institutions. However, following a total 
collapse, policy initiatives seeking information on responsibility are less likely to have an 
impact on surviving banks or new banks, creating a policy space for politicians to be more 
responsive to voters’ demands for accountability.  
 
4 The term “retributive justice” refers to the “repair of justice through unilateral imposition of punishment” 
(Wenzel et al. 2008: 375). We use the terms “retributive justice” and “accountability” interchangeably to refer 
to punitive measures against bank executives. Wenzel, Michael, Tyler G. Okimoto, Norman T. Feather, and 
Michael J. Platow. "Retributive and restorative justice." Law and human behavior 32, no. 5 (2008): 375. 
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
determinants of bank executives’ prosecutions post-2008 and explores how steps taken by 
elected officials can facilitate (or impede) the criminal investigations of the national 
prosecutorial authorities. Section 3 presents our argument on the relationship between the 
nature of the crisis and the extent to which policymakers will pursue a policy of 
accountability. The research design is described in section 4, where we also justify the 
selection of Iceland and Cyprus as our case studies. Section 5 tests our argument by 
exploring the variations in policy responses to post-crisis accountability in these two 
countries. Section 6 discusses alternative explanations and notes their inability to offer a 
more convincing explanation of the puzzle. The paper concludes by discussing the 
implications of the analysis and suggesting avenues for further research. 
    
2. Holding bank executives accountable after economic crises 
2.1 Limits of prosecutors and the powerful status of bank executives 
Unsurprisingly, debates on accountability have taken center stage of academic literature in 
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. 5  In particular debates related to the 
responsibility of bank executives that surfaced in media reports and academic literature 
remained highly controversial. While some of the main causes of the crisis had no fraudulent 
or illegal character, scholars pointed out how some financial practices should raise concerns 
about the responsibility of individual bank executives and suggested the need for 
prosecution. For instance, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission created by the US 
 
5 For a broader theoretical discussion of post-crisis accountability see Hilliard, Nadia, Iosif Kovras, and 
Neophytos Loizides. "The perils of accountability after crisis: ambiguity, policy legacies, and value trade-offs." 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2020): 1-20; Dawson, Mark. "The Legal and Political Accountability 
Structure of ‘Post-Crisis’ EU Economic Governance." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 53, no. 5 (2015): 
976-993. 
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Congress to investigate the origins of the crisis mentions variants of the word “fraud” 157 
times in its report,6 highlighting how the selling of mortgages to borrowers who lacked the 
capacity to repay, the selling of obscurely structured finance products to investors, or the 
misevaluation of these products were not honest mistakes. In the words of Jed Rakoff, 
Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, “the crisis 
was in material respects the product of intentional fraud.”.7 However, for the most part, 
bank executives were not prosecuted post-2008, both in major economies and in more 
peripheral European economies. For example, US and British authorities did not bring 
charges against high level executives for charges related to the crisis for almost a decade. 
Similarly, authorities in Ireland and Spain have been unsuccessful, as they have prosecuted 
only a handful of bankers (allegedly) involved in crisis-related white-collar crimes, resulting 
only in few convictions. As the head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, acknowledged, “Despite 
evidence of actual malfeasance in several cases, it has been mostly corporate balance sheets 
that have borne the brunt of legal sanctions for reckless behaviour -- not individuals”.8 What 
explains this outcome? Scholars tackling this question have focused on two clusters of 
explanations. 
The first set of explanations emphasizes the role of prosecutorial authorities and the 
challenges they face when establishing the criminal culpability of bank executives in a court 
of law. The very nature of financial crimes raises intrinsic obstacles to obtaining the 
information required to prove culpability. An effective investigation will often involve 
gaining access to a vast number of documents, tracing millions of transactions, and securing 
 
6 Rakoff, Jed S. "The financial crisis: why have no high-level executives been prosecuted?." The New York Review 
of Books 9 (2014):2 
7 Ibid, 3. 
8 Lagarde, Christine. "The Role of Personal Accountability in Reforming Culture and Behavior in the Financial 
Services Industry." Speech at the New York Fed 5 (2015). 
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testimonies, to name only a few. Not only are these pieces of evidence generally inaccessible 
to public scrutiny, but the technical complexity of modern finance requires prosecutorial 
authorities to have significant resources and specialized expertise. 9  Moreover, beyond 
securing access to evidence linking individuals to actions, substantiating corporate crimes 
necessitates proving beyond a reasonable doubt the “intent” to commit a fraud, manipulate 
the market, or commit other corporate crimes.10 The complexity of prosecuting financial 
crimes, coupled with previous experience (or lack thereof) in investigating these crimes, 
shapes the likelihood of prosecutors bringing charges against executives, opting for a 
settlement, or targeting the corporation.11 
The second cluster of explanations centers on the powerful status of the offenders.12 The 
criminology literature suggests that, unlike street criminals, corporate criminals have 
economic and political clout, thus inhibiting white-collar prosecutions and/or leading to 
more lenient sentencing.13 Powerful corporations – particularly in the US - cultivate a tight 
network of contacts with state prosecutorial authorities, as evident by the common 
movement of state prosecutors to work as corporate lawyers; this implicit “revolving door” 
minimizes state authorities’ determination to bring criminal charges against corporations or 
banks.14 Moreover, prosecutors may be reluctant to bring charges against banks and bank 
executives, fearing a possible adverse impact on economic recovery. These people are simply 
 
9 Buell, Samuel W. Capital Offenses: Business Crime and Punishment in America's Corporate Age. WW Norton & 
Company, 2016. 
10 Henning, Peter J. "Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will the 
Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go." U. Pitt. L. Rev. 54 (1992):450; Buell, 208. 
11 Garrett, Brandon. Too big to Jail. Harvard University Press, 2014; Eisinger, 2017. 
12Barak, Gregg. Theft of a nation: Wall street looting and federal regulatory colluding. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2012; ontell, Henry N., William K. Black, and Gilbert Geis. "Too big to fail, too powerful to jail? On the 
absence of criminal prosecutions after the 2008 financial meltdown." Crime, Law and Social Change 61, no. 1 
(2014): 1-13; Henning, 1992 
13 Benson, Michael L., and Esteban Walker. "Sentencing the white-collar offender." American Sociological Review 
(1988): 294-302 
14 Barak, 2012 
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“too big to jail”.15 Otherwise stated, the powerful status of banks creates an obstacle to the 
capacity of authorities to investigate bankers. 
While the constraints reviewed above certainly have a cooling effect on the desire to 
prosecute bank executives, these alone provide only a partial picture of the determinants of 
retributive justice in the aftermath of banking crises. The constraints on the capacity of 
prosecutorial initiative identified by the literature are not fixed; instead, they are partly 
shaped by the institutional framework within which prosecutorial authorities operate. The 
financial resources available to prosecutors, the existing laws determining what counts as 
illegal behavior and how evidence can be gathered, and the mandate and priorities of 
prosecutorial authorities are all subject to change. To explain these factors, we need to go 
beyond a focus on prosecutorial authorities and their interaction with banking executives to 
consider a third set of actors: politicians.  
 
2.2 How politicians influence the prospects of prosecutions after a crisis 
While politicians in western democracies cannot interfere with the operation of the national 
judiciary to initiate prosecutions after a financial crisis, they can shape the prospect of 
prosecutions. In using the term ‘politicians’ we mostly refer to the incumbent/party in 
power that possess the capacity and power to shape policies, while at the same time their 
decision making is shaped by electoral pressures. While other officials may yield significant 
power to shape policies in times of crisis, such as central bank governors or regulators, they 
are not subject to electoral pressures. Similarly, other representatives of the political elite, 
such as the opposition officials they may engage in cheap talk without having the 
institutional power to shape decision-making. From this vantage point, politicians have a 
 
15 Garrett 2014; Rakoff 2014 
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number of tools at their disposal to facilitate (or thwart) the capacity of prosecutorial 
authorities to carry out effective investigations and bring charges or to indirectly influence 
their priorities. 
First, incumbents can influence the likelihood of prosecutions by exercising their power 
over the purse strings. As discussed above, the complexity of financial activities makes evidence 
gathering a highly resource-intensive process. By granting (or denying) prosecutorial 
authorities the additional financial support required to acquire technical expertise and 
dedicated forensic technologies to access incriminatory evidence, the incumbent shapes 
prosecutors’ capacity to investigate crime. When politicians provide little support, it becomes 
extremely difficult for judicial authorities to launch an effective criminal probe. This is 
particularly relevant in times of crisis when the judiciary itself may not be immune from 
policies of austerity and budget cuts. Operating with scarce resources makes it impossible for 
prosecutors to investigate all cases; they will inevitably have to be selective. The literature 
identifies the “likelihood of success” as the most important factor in decisions to prosecute 
particular sets of cases over other ones,16 with the existing caseload and the availability of 
resources and expertise playing a crucial role.17  
 Second, politicians can facilitate prosecutions by amending the existing legal framework. 
The burden of proof in white-collar crimes is usually challenging, as prosecutors have to 
show defendants “intended” to commit fraud or manipulate the market. This is a major 
obstacle; prosecutors may refrain from taking on cases of white-collar crimes with limited 
prospects of conviction. Although retroactive change in the legal framework to make certain 
 
16 Myers, Martha A., and John Hagan. "Private and public trouble: Prosecutors and the allocation of court 
resources." Social Problems 26, no. 4 (1979):439 
17 Gurney, J. N. (1985). Factors influencing the decision to prosecute economic crime. Criminology, 23(4):613; 
Benson, Michael L., William J. Maakestad, Francis T. Cullen, and Gilbert Geis. "District attorneys and 
corporate crime: Surveying the prosecutorial gatekeepers." Criminology 26, no. 3 (1988):512. 
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actions illegal is not feasible, politicians can facilitate criminal investigations in other ways. 
For example, a political decision to assist prosecutorial authorities by simplifying the 
procedure of confiscating data from banks and individual executives could be a significant 
boost.  
Third, the government may set up special ad hoc prosecutorial bodies mandated to carry out 
a criminal probe on actions in the run up to a crisis, thereby framing the crisis as an 
extraordinary event in need of special investigation. For instance, after the failure of many 
savings and loan institutions in the US in the late 1980s, various task forces were created by 
US authorities, resulting in 1,100 cases being referred to prosecutors.18 Along the same lines, 
during the recent Global Recession, the US government created the Financial Fraud 
Enforcement Task Force; this one was not as successful as its predecessor and was criticized 
as a “sideshow” for not prosecuting executives who bore responsibility for the 2008 financial 
crisis.19 The creation of special prosecutorial mechanisms is more often the exception than 
the rule, however, as political elites may prefer to cite “business as usual” and let existing 
structures of the judiciary lead investigations. 
Finally, politicians can influence the likelihood of future prosecutions by establishing a 
fact-finding commission/commission of inquiry to shed light on the causes of (and those responsible 
for) the meltdown. A prominent example is the Pecora Commission, set up to document the 
causes of the 1929 Wall Street Crash. Inaugurating a fact-finding body sends a clear signal to 
prosecutorial authorities that accountability is a central issue to the government. Although 
the mandate of most fact-finding commissions precludes attribution of criminal 
responsibility, the final report of these bodies could direct prosecutorial authorities to 
 
18 Calavita, Kitty, and Henry Pontell. "" Saving the Savings and Loans: US Government Response to Financial 
Crime." Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates (1995): 199-214 
19 Eisinger, 2010 
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potential cases of misconduct, creating momentum for criminal investigation. For example, 
the shocking revelations of the Pecora hearings framed criminally negligent bankers as 
banksters -- drawing parallels with famous gangsters of the time and legitimizing the political 
appetite to go after a handful of previously untouchable bankers.20 The final report of such 
commissions not only gives the big picture of the causes of economic failure but can also 
pinpoint cases requiring investigation, thereby facilitating the work of prosecutors. 
In sum, while not directly responsible for initiating prosecutions, politicians have 
access to important policy tools and are able to remove some of the roadblocks hindering 
prosecutions of bank executives. At the same time, there were significant variations in the 
extent to which European countries emerging from the recent global crisis deployed these 
tools (if at all). In some countries, politicians put criminal accountability center stage, while 
in other countries, they did not. For instance, while Iceland set up a special body to 
investigate the causes of the crisis, Cyprus followed a “business as usual" model, with the 
established prosecutorial and police authorities tasked to investigate and bring charges. What 
explains this variation? The next section outlines our theoretical answer. 
 
3. Theory: What explains political appetite for retribution? 
In this section we consider the incentives of policymakers in the aftermath of a financial 
crisis to design policies to promote accountability in the financial sector. The extent to which 
politicians are proactive in this domain cannot simply be attributed to the extent to which 
misconduct and criminal activities trigger a crisis. The concealed nature of financial crimes 
makes it difficult for policymakers to assess whether widespread misconduct or illegal 
 
20 (Perino, Michael. The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand Pecora's Investigation of the Great Crash Forever 
Changed American Finance. Penguin, 2010 
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activities were committed in the lead-up to the crisis. Yet politicians are under pressure to 
devise a policy response even before the dust has settled. 
To explain the variation in the extent to which different countries prioritized different 
policies post-2008, we propose going beyond the roots of the financial crisis and focusing on 
its aftermath. Our framework recognizes that the way a crisis unfolds significantly influences 
politicians’ desire for retributive justice. We highlight two salient factors: voters’ demands for 
a proactive approach and the impact pro-accountability policies may have on the economy. 
First, in normal (non-crisis) times, the issue of holding banking executives 
accountable and investigating financial crimes is unlikely to receive much attention in the 
media and among voters. As a result, policy proposals aimed at strengthening the resources 
available to prosecutorial authorities to investigate corporate crimes are less likely to be a 
pressing issue from an electoral standpoint. Financial crises can be expected to change the 
equation, especially when the failure of a financial institution inflicts costs on a significant 
part of the population. Most commonly, the costs imposed by a bank failure are indirect, in 
the form of major fiscal expenditures when the government is forced to intervene and 
mitigate the economic spillovers of a banking collapse by bailing out the affected 
institutions. But as the severity of the banking crisis increases, this could result in more direct 
costs imposed on voters, such as depositors not being protected or small bondholders being 
bailed-in.21  
In these cases, once the people on the street are directly affected, the incumbent 
government faces stronger demands for proactivity. 22  From an electoral standpoint, 
developing a policy that would apportion all blame to “reckless” bankers could prove 
 
21 Chwieroth, Jeffrey M., and Andrew Walter. The Wealth Effect. Cambridge University Press, 2019. 
22 Ibid 
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beneficial, or at least minimize the political costs. Failure to do so might be perceived as an 
attempt at a “cover up”, thus incurring significant electoral costs.  
Voters’ demands for accountability explain why policymakers are more likely to 
reform the policy and institutional framework guiding the investigations and prosecutions of 
financial crimes after a crisis rather than before, but this is not the only factor shaping 
political incentives to pursue retributive justice. As the “too big to jail” literature reviewed 
above highlights, the investigation of banks and bank officials could be destabilizing if it 
uncovers weaknesses in the management of these institutions.23 Consider, for example, US 
Attorney General Eric Holder’s comment on concerns about prosecuting powerful 
corporate actors: “If you do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative impact on the 
national economy, perhaps even the world economy”.24 In this case, incumbents are likely to 
consider the potential impact upon the banking sector and, ultimately, the long-term political 
costs. In particular, they may be deterred from pursuing a proactive agenda of accountability 
if they think protracted inquiries or criminal investigations may negatively impact public and 
market confidence in the national banking industry, deterring future investments and 
prolonging the crisis. 
Not all types of crises generate the same concerns. It is important to distinguish 
between crises that result in the collapse of a banking institution or the broader banking 
sector and crises that lead to intervention, for example, when policymakers intervene by 
designing a bail-out or bail-in. In the former case, banks are no longer operational (at least in 
their pre-crisis form) and, as argued above, information on the responsibility for the collapse 
 
23 Garrett 2014; Rakoff 2014 
24 Cited in Quigley Quigley, Robert. "The Impulse Towards Individual Criminal Punishment After the Financial 
Crisis." Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 22 (2015): 107. 
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will have less impact, leaving politicians free to adopt policies that in other settings may be 
seen as hostile to the financial world.  
In the latter case, when policymakers prevent a banking collapse through a bail-out 
or bail-in, their capacity to pursue an accountability agenda interacts with the fragility of the 
banks. More specifically, the capacity of policymakers to mitigate the impact of the crisis and 
restore growth is often tied to the recovery of the existing banking institutions. Criminal 
investigations and other policies of accountability may clash with this objective insofar as 
they may raise inconvenient truths that could prolong the crisis. At the most fundamental 
level, it could bring chronic mismanagement and corrupt practices into the spotlight. In turn, 
this – or fines imposed – may incur financial or reputational costs to new shareholders and 
harm the government’s efforts to restore confidence in the still fragile banking system and 
impede the possibility of privatizing the bank. Besides, in the aftermath of “managed crises,” 
even though their reputation may be damaged, bankers continue to yield significant power in 
the reconstruction of the fragile banking sector. Thus, the party in power may think twice 
before supporting policies of retribution, preferring to invest in a forward-looking narrative 
of successful economic recovery to maximize its opportunity of re-election.25 Initiatives to 
bring banks into the spotlight are likely focus on the present health of banks and their 
capacity to withstand future economic shocks rather than on a backward-looking dissection 
of individuals’ actions before the crisis. For instance, in an effort to restore public trust in 
the financial system, public authorities often use “stress tests” and other types of external 
 
25 Powell Jr, G. Bingham, and Guy D. Whitten. "A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account 
of the political context." American Journal of Political Science (1993): 391-414 
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audits to determine the present health of banks and their capacity to withstand future 
economic shocks; this type of transparency, in turn, attracts investors.26   
 In sum, while a financial crisis may generate demands from voters to hold bank 
executives accountable, policymakers’ incentives to act are mediated by the management of 
the crisis and the state of the banking industry. Table 1 illustrates the argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Research Design 
 
26 Petrella, Giovanni, and Andrea Resti. "Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank 
opaqueness?." Journal of Banking & Finance 37, no. 12 (2013): 5406-5420 
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To address the variation in policies of accountability after financial crises, we comparatively 
analyze two cases that are “similar” in their background conditions, yet puzzlingly different 
in their outcomes.27 Specifically, although conditions were similar in Iceland and Cyprus, 
politicians in Iceland pursued a proactive agenda of retribution, but those in Cyprus did not. 
Exploring two ‘small’ peripheral European states can help us test a prevalent literature of the 
policy response of ‘small states’ to the recent crisis.28 In particular, we select Cyprus because 
its pre-crisis experience is a close approximation of the Icelandic experience, making it the 
“most likely” case to adopt a similar policy response (i.e. proactive agenda of retribution). If 
we do not observe this outcome in Cyprus, we will be far less likely to see it in other 
“milder” crises.  
 
Figure 1: Economic characteristics of European countries experiencing a banking crisis after 2007  
 
 
27 Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative politics and the comparative method. American political science review, 65(3), 
682-693 
28 Thorhallsson, Baldur, and Peadar Kirby. "Financial crises in Iceland and Ireland: does European Union and 
Euro membership matter?." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 50, no. 5 (2012): 801-818. 
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Sources: Data on size of the financial industry from OECD Structural Analysis of 
National Economies (STAN) dataset.  Data on Non-Performing Loans and Recapitalization 
Cost from Laeven and Valencia (2018) dataset29.  
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the two countries share a number of economic characteristics. 
First, while other countries faced public debt or housing crises, in both Iceland and Cyprus, 
the roots of the crisis lie in the reckless expansion of the banking sector (vertical axis in 
Figure 1). The countries shared a common developmental model that relied extensively on 
an oversized financial sector. Second, the severity of the shock faced by the banking sector 
in the two countries was similar, as measured by the number of non-performing loans at the 
peak of the crisis (horizontal axis in Figure 1). Third, in both countries, the attempt to 
mitigate the crisis resulted in large societal costs, such as the extraordinary costs of 
recapitalizing the banking sector (see Figure 1). Moreover, in both countries, the crisis was 
followed by the introduction of capital controls, bank runs, a haircut on deposits, and the 
collapse of at least one of the largest banks. As a result, taxpayers and depositors were 
significantly affected, making accountability a politically salient theme from day one. Fourth, 
both countries had an established legal framework to deal with corporate crimes – including 
insider trading, market manipulation or breaches of fiduciary duty - yet limited expertise in 
prosecuting these crimes. 
The two countries also differ in important ways, some of which we explore below. 
One important element of difference is the fact that Cyprus is an EU member and part of 
the European Monetary Union, while Iceland remain outside both. Existing scholarship has 
emphasized how the EMU membership played a significant role in constraining the policy 
 
29 Laeven, Mr Luc, and Mr Fabian Valencia. Systemic banking crises revisited. International Monetary Fund, 2018. 
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response of its members and in particular encouraging bailouts of ailing banks over letting 
them collapse out of fear of contagion.30 At the same time, it is worth noting how the EU 
and EMU membership do not constrain the capacity of countries to pursue pro-
accountability policies, as clear from the variation of conduct across European countries. 
In short, given the common background conditions, the comparative analysis will 
illuminate the ways their policy responses towards the crisis were shaped by an independent 
variable - the management of the crisis and its impact on the banking industry. Notably, in 
Iceland, the banks collapsed: the three main banks that accounted for 97% of the banking 
sector were put into receivership and liquidation, and new institutions were created in their 
place. In Cyprus, the banking system survived. To determine how these different banking 
conditions influenced the policy response, we use process tracing to identify the causal 
mechanisms driving particular policies of retribution. To identify the respective causal 
chains, we deploy standard process tracing tests to eliminate alternative hypotheses (“hoop 
tests”) or “smoking gun” tests to increase confidence in the selected hypothesis. 31  Our 
analysis draws on more than 55 in-depth elite interviews and a period of fieldwork in the two 
countries, bolstering our confidence in our ability to trace the processes.32  
 
5. Analysis 
5.1 Iceland 
Iceland was the first European country to experience the aftershock of the Great Recession. 
The colossal and direct impact of the Crash led to an unprecedented mobilization of the 
 
30 Sandbu, Martin. Europe's Orphan: The Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt. Princeton University Press, 2015. 
31 Mahoney, James. "After KKV: The new methodology of qualitative research." World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 
120-147; Collier, David. "Understanding process tracing." PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 4 (2011): 823-
830. 
32 Tansey, Oisín. "Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability sampling." PS: Political Science 
& Politics 40, no. 4 (2007): 765-772. 
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citizenry - called the “Pots & Pans Revolution” – in a country with no previous culture of 
protest.33 A key theme in the waves of protest was retribution, expressed in demands to 
identify those responsible and sack them. Voters’ pressure on politicians for accountability 
was so great that it would have been electorally costly for any party to ignore it, especially the 
incumbent, the Independence Party (ibid). Having been in power for almost 15 years 
preceding the crisis and as the pioneer of Viking Capitalism, the Independence Party was 
seen as largely responsible for the (mismanagement) of the crisis and was forced to put itself 
under the microscope. The country’s political culture further reinforced responsiveness. 
According to one of the opposition leaders, the PM understood that “the events were of 
such magnitude that there would never be any agreement or reconciliation unless they were 
thoroughly investigated”. 34  Still, this “principled” response was greatly facilitated by the 
impact of the crisis on the banking industry. 
Unlike other countries, the government’s bailout of the banking sector failed to 
restore faith in the main banking institutions. As a result, the three main banks (Glitnir, 
Kaupthing, & Landsbanki) accounting for 97% of the banking sector were put into 
receivership and liquidation, creating one of the world’s largest corporate bankruptcies on 
record. New banks were created to take over domestic banking operations. As all the three 
major banks collapsed, preserving the confidence in these institutions was not a priority 
during crisis management, and reverting to the pre-crisis finance-led growth model was not 
an option 35 . This meant politicians in Iceland were not constrained by the possible 
 
33 Bernburg, Jón Gunnar. Economic crisis and mass protest: The pots and pans revolution in Iceland. Routledge, 2016. 
34 Cited in Hjalmarsson, Ragnar. (forthcoming) Transitional Justice after Economic Collapse: The case of 
Iceland, PhD dissertation, Hartie School of Governance 
35 Benediktsdottir, Sigridur, Jon Danielsson, and Gylfi Zoega. "Lessons from a collapse of a financial system." 
Economic Policy 26, no. 66 (2011): 183-235; Johnsen, Gudrun. Bringing down the banking system: Lessons from Iceland. 
Springer, 2014. 
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consequences of confrontational policies of accountability on the banking industry, and 
policies of accountability took root.  
The Emergency Law (No.125/2008), enacted with wide cross-party consensus in 
December 2008, clearly established the centrality of accountability in the broader crisis 
management policy. This legislation outlined the crisis management response and included a 
number of provisions directed at promoting the accountability of the bank executives 
responsible for the crisis. A cornerstone of the accountability architecture included in the 
Emergency Law was “truth recovery”. In the early period after the crisis, the “Viking 
bankers” signaled their willingness to participate in a truth commission similar to the South 
African model, with amnesty offered in exchange for revealing the truth.36 However, with 
the collapse of the banks, the idea was flatly rejected. Instead, the legislation included the 
creation of a truth commission (Special Investigation Commission, SIC) to investigate and 
document patterns of policy, institutional, and other failures.37   The truth commission’s 
mandate was very harsh, with provisions to punish those obstructing access to evidence with 
up to two years’ jail time. Drawing on a very thorough “forensic” investigation, the final 
report identified the key causes of the meltdown, including the rapid expansion of the 
banking sector, the excessive access of the owners of the largest banks to their banks’ credit, 
and the instrumental use of banks to pursue the interests of large shareholders rather than 
the banks’ interests.38  
Another cornerstone of the accountability architecture was “prosecutions.” More 
specifically, politicians had to decide whether the task of investigating cases of alleged white-
 
36 Cited in Hjalmarsson, forthcoming 
37 Kovras, I., McDaid, S., & Hjalmarsson, R. (2018). Truth Commissions after Economic Crises: Political 
Learning or Blame Game?. Political Studies, 66(1), 173-191 
38 Hjlarmarsson Ragnar, ‘Accountability After Crisis’. Country Report: Iceland. London (2018):14 Also 
available at: https://accountabilityaftereconomiccrisis.com/assets/uploads/Policy-Report-Iceland-Eng-.pdf 
[last accessed 16 April 2019] 
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collar crimes flagged by the SIC and bringing charges against those responsible for the Crash 
would be led by existing law enforcement and judicial authorities or new/ad hoc 
prosecutorial authorities. Our interviews with members of the judiciary indicated that the 
established structures were anemic. The designated state authorities tasked to investigate 
white-collar crimes had limited experience. For example, the “Economic Crimes Unit” – 
part of the national Commissioner of the Icelandic Police – was an understaffed unit with 
inadequate capacity to investigate corporate crimes. As a state prosecutor remarked, “There 
was really not much understanding of this area, these so-called white-collar crimes. So our 
experience was not that great, though of course economic crimes were taking place”.39  
Instead of relying on the national judicial authorities, a decision was made to 
establish a new ad hoc body to investigate the crisis-related cases, the Office of the Special 
Prosecutor (OSP).40 The government also took action to ensure the success of this body. 
One important step was a legal provision vesting the OSP with the power to procure data 
related to its investigation.41 Accessing data, documents, and other potentially incriminatory 
evidence was crucial if the investigations were to succeed. A novel clause in the Act 
establishing the OSP authorized the authorities to confiscate data related to their scope of 
investigation (Act No. 25/2009, art 5). In effect, while in the past, a court order was needed, 
this clause forced banks under investigation to share all the data requested by the OSP. The 
Chief Prosecutor explained to us how the legislation facilitated the work of the OSP: “[I]f 
you are constantly requesting material from the banks, you always have to have a court ruling 
on each and every application, you hit some problems. It takes too much time”.42 
 
39 Interview with Icelandic State Prosecutor, Reykjavik, 8 December 2016. 
40 Ibid 
41 Act No. 25/2009 (art 5). There was also a provision for whistle-blowers to come forward and share 
information to support criminal investigations  
42 Interview with the Head of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Reykjavik, 18 April 2017 
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The second step taken by the government to facilitate the pursuit of accountability 
was the allocation of ample resources for the OSP to carry out its investigations.43 When the 
parliament set up the OSP in early 2009, it was envisioned as a small office of approximately 
5-10 staff on a tight budget; it would investigate only a handful of cases associated with the 
Crash and close down by the end of 2010. But subsequent decisions strengthened its 
operations. By 2012-13, the OSP had received ample resources, allowing  it to employ over 
100 staff members and acquire expertise in areas that immensely facilitated the pace of 
investigations. Consequently, between 2010 and 2016, the OSP prosecuted 67 individuals, a 
large number for a small country with a population of approximately 350,000. 
It is important to note how the government’s proactive stance at the beginning of 
the crisis and the gradual success of the OSP generated an “accountability cycle”. After the 
incumbent government collapsed as a result of the “Pots & Pans Revolution,” the Social 
Democrats and Left-Green Movement formed a coalition government in early 2009; they 
promised to continue to pursue a policy that would identify and punish the culprits.44 This 
commitment was reflected in the gradual expansion of the mandate of the OSP to include all 
white-collar crimes in Iceland beyond the crisis-related cases. But the support for this 
institution did not wane even after the return to government of the Independence Party five 
years after the Crash. Although the new leadership wanted to draw a line with the past and 
move forward, the budget tabled for 2014 spared the OSP from the budget cuts imposed on 
other parts of the state.  
In effect, the total collapse of the banking industry was instrumental in boosting 
support for retributive justice. As the banks were effectively wiped out, political elites did 
 
 
43 The estimated total cost of its operations is 5,06 bn ISK (approximately €36,7 million) (Hjalmarsson 2018) 
44 Hjalmarsson 2018:10 
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not need to worry about the potential impact of investigations on the stability or reputation 
of the banking institutions. A local prosecutor explicitly cited the collapse of the banks as the 
most crucial factor driving the investigations by highlighting a counterfactual: “If the banks 
had weathered this (crisis) then nobody would have wanted to rock the boat […] If they 
would have just barely survived, one does not know what would have happened…it would 
have been a completely different situation, so that of course changed the situation”.45 A 
senior member of the judiciary confirmed this: “I think that just somehow that this would 
have looked completely different if the Crash had not happened. Then somehow the whole 
scene would have been different in regards to access to data, I think that is absolutely safe to 
say”.46  
 
5.2 Cyprus47 
The Cypriot banks followed a similar trajectory to the Icelandic ones, with rapid expansion 
in the pre-crisis years, reaching almost eight times the GDP in 2009.48 The financial crisis 
took longer to reach the periphery of the Eurozone, and Cyprus was the last casualty. In 
2013, the Cypriot government agreed to an international bailout package with the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (the “Troika") that included a “bail-in” of deposits above €100,000 in the 
country’s second-largest bank (Laiki Bank) and an equivalent levy on half of the uninsured 
deposits in the country’s largest bank (Bank of Cyprus). The bail-in paved the way for a run 
on the banks and the imposition of capital controls.  
 
45 Interview with 2nd anonymous Icelandic Prosecutor, Reykjavik, 8 December 2016 
46 Interview with District Court Judge in Iceland, Reykjavik, 6 December 2016 
47 We use the term Cyprus to refer to developments in the Republic of Cyprus. 
48 Michaelides Alexander. ‘Cyprus: From Boom to Bail-in’, in Michaelides, A. G., & Orphanides, A. (Eds.). 
(2016). The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy Lessons from the Cyprus Economic Crisis. World Scientific:122; Zenios, Stavros A. 
"Fairness and reflexivity in the Cyprus bail-in." Empirica 43, no. 3 (2016): 579-606. 
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All these ingredients ensured the crisis had a direct and severe impact on people’s daily 
lives. As a result, the bail-in was followed by the first massive wave of protests since the 
Turkish invasion in 1974. The protest was even more impressive when we consider that the 
Greek Cypriot political culture is strongly averse to anti-government protest.49 The outcry 
increased the salience of holding individuals responsible for the crisis accountable and forced 
the government to respond. Days after signing the bail-in package and agreeing to the 
confiscation of uninsured deposits, the government added a policy of accountability for the 
crisis to its agenda. In the ceremony welcoming the new Chief of Police and the new 
Attorney general, the President clearly framed the priorities of the government, explaining 
“we have no right to disappoint society,” thus explicitly acknowledging the public demand to 
punish those responsible.50  
In all these respects, the Cypriot experience mirrors the aftermath of the Crash in 
Iceland. At the same time, the development of this agenda did not match the scope and 
ambition of Iceland. First, a few weeks after the meltdown, the government set up an 
independent commission of inquiry to shed light on the causes.51 While the mandate of the 
commission initially included the provision that evidence collected during hearings could be 
used for criminal cases, within a few weeks, the mandate was changed, turning the 
commission into a purely fact-finding enterprise.52 
Second, politicians in Cyprus and Iceland faced similar dilemmas over the extent to 
which they could rely on the established investigative authorities to lead the investigation and 
 
49 Charalambous, Giorgos, and Gregoris Ioannou. "Party systems, party-society linkages, and contentious acts: 
Cyprus in a comparative, Southern European perspective." Mobilization 22, no. 1 (2017): 97-119. 
50 Pegasiou A (2018) Accountability After Crisis. Country Report: Cyprus. London: Also available at: 
https://accountabilityaftereconomiccrisis.com/assets/uploads/Policy-Report-Cyprus-Eng.pdf  [last accessed 
16 April 2019] 
51 Zenios 2013 
52 Pantelides P. (2013) " AG orders criminal probe into economic crisis', Cyprus Mail, July 2nd 2013, also 
available at: https://cyprus-mail.com/old/2013/07/02/ag-orders-criminal-probe-into-economic-crisis 
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prosecution of potential white-collar crimes associated with the crisis. The police included a 
special branch on economic crimes, the Economic Crimes Investigation Office, but this unit 
dealt with very few cases in the pre-crisis years, and it was not well equipped to deal with 
more complex corporate crimes. The former Attorney General (AG) admitted that the 
“inability to effectively investigate such cases” was probably the most important reason for 
the non-effective prosecution of bankers in Cyprus: “[H]onestly we didn’t even understand 
the crime, neither me nor the police”.53 Still, instead of creating a new special/ad hoc body as 
in Iceland, the Cypriot government decided to reshuffle existing personnel from different 
departments of the police and the economic crimes investigation office into a new Special 
Task Force within the existing structures to lead the inquiries. Moreover, the Task Force 
reported to the Ministry of Justice, setting the tone of the investigations; decisions on the 
budget, expertise, and staff deemed essential for success were screened by the Ministry.  
Third, unlike in Iceland, the incumbent government did not introduce changes to the 
legislative framework to set the stage for an effective investigation. According to a 
prominent Cypriot MP, the framework remained out-dated and inhibited police 
investigations, making it extremely difficult to access and confiscate data (Interview N.7).  
Finally, the government provided only limited additional resources to the existing 
prosecutorial authorities to support criminal investigations.54 In particular, most resources 
directed towards the office the Law Office were used to cover expenses related to the legal 
representation of the state in international courts and arbitration processes stemming from 
the bail-in provisions of 2013 (Fileleftheros 2018), with no parallel investment of new 
 
53 Interview with the former Attorney general of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 27 July 2017 
54 Pegasiou, 2018 
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resources in criminal investigations. Although precise data are not publicly available,55 most 
informed participants estimated the total number of investigative staff working on cases 
related to the crisis were in the region of 25 to 30.56 This adversely affected the pace of 
investigations. When asked about the reasons for the delay in processing cases, a senior 
member of the Supreme Court pinpointed the lack of resources and staff.57  
In sum, unlike in Iceland, the policy of accountability endorsed by the Cypriot 
government after the crisis did not remove the structural, financial, and legal constraints to 
the investigation and prosecution of individuals responsible for the crisis. Instead, according 
to informed observers, the incumbent government’s plan was to selectively focus on a few 
cases to appease the public demand for justice, without launching a thorough investigation 
(Interview Nos 18, 19). What could explain this outcome? 
To answer, we need to consider how the political appetite for a proactive policy of 
accountability interacted with the fragile state of the banking system. While in Iceland, new 
banks were founded to take over the domestic operations of three major banks (Kaupthing, 
Landsbanki, and Glitnir), in Cyprus, a decision was made to turn the weaker of the two main 
Cypriot banks (Popular/Laiki Bank) into a “bad bank” to absorb all toxic assets from the 
banking sector in Cyprus. At the same time, all guaranteed deposits were moved to the Bank 
of Cyprus (BoC), the (“good”) bank the state decided to save.  
The interaction between the prospect of a proactive policy of accountability and the 
policy objective of preserving the fragile financial sector was particularly evident in the 
handling of the Cyprus Cooperative Bank (CCB), a network of local credit institutions. As 
part of the IMF-sponsored program, the government nationalized 77% of the CCB, 
 
55 Despite repeated official requests to get access to the budget and the manpower of the bodies involved in 
criminal investigation, we received no response from the Cypriot authorities.  
56 Interview with MP of the center-right party DISY and Economics professor, Nicosia, 26 july 2017 
57 Interview with high ranking staff athe Supreme Court of the Republic of Cyprus, Nicosia, 15 July 2017 
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incurring a total cost of approximately €1.8bn for taxpayers. 58  The public anger about 
lingering corruption/mismanagement, along with the powerless status of the local board 
members involved in the practices, made this a “most likely” case to see official investigation 
in 2013,59 but no specific action was taken in the aftermath of the crisis by the government 
to investigate the widespread corrupt practices that characterized this institution in the years 
before the crisis.  This course of action was influenced by concerns about the implications of 
an investigation. A key priority during this period was stabilizing the cooperative sector so 
that “in the future it [CCB] can cover potential capital needs by raising money from private 
investors”.60 The Troika’s timeline for the privatization of the bank shaped the political 
priorities of the government, most notably its reluctance to inflict financial or reputational 
costs on new shareholders that the government had to entice to join in the first place. An 
anonymous member of the Cooperative Bank was clear about possible consequences: 
“Pushing hard for criminal investigations could act as a disincentive for potential investors 
given the legal and other repercussions this could have for the bank” (Interview No.20). An 
investigation could also have unearthed inconvenient truths about the politicians themselves; 
for example, the chronic lack of political control of the boards of cooperative banks was 
partly responsible for the dire straits of the cooperative sector during the crisis.61 All these 
considerations curbed the politicians’ enthusiasm for criminal investigations in the 
cooperative sector (and, more broadly, in the banking industry after the 2013 meltdown).  
 
58 Hardouvelis, G. A. (2016). Overcoming the crisis in Cyprus. The Cyprus Bail-in: Policy lessons from the Cyprus 
Economic Crisis:251 
59 Ioannides G (2018) Who is to blame for the Co-op Bank disaster? Cyprus Mail, 1 July 2018, also available at: 
https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/07/01/who-is-to-blame-for-the-co-op-bank-disaster/ [last accessed 16 April 
2019] 
60 European Commission (2015) Press Release: Commission approves additional aid for Cypriot cooperative 
banks on the basis of an amended restructuring plan, 18 December 2015, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6365_en.htm  
61 Arestis Y., Charalambous Y., Georgiou Y. (2019) ‘Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Causes 
of the Collapse of the Cooperative Sector’, Nicosia, 1st March 2019, Available at: https://cyprus-mail.com/wp-
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It was only after the party in power decided in 2018 to sell the CCB to a competitor 
(Hellenic Bank) that politicians seriously considered launching an inquiry into its 
management. The decision to allow Hellenic Bank to acquire the “good part” of the CCB 
while the government guaranteed that any “bad/non-performing loans” would be absorbed 
by the government was seen as extremely unfavorable for the interests of Cypriot taxpayers 
and created a public uproar.62 As a result of the public discontent, a second committee of 
inquiry was set up to investigate both the chronic problems of the CCB and the conditions 
of its privatization in 2018. Other than this specific case, however, the accountability agenda 
was far less prominent in Cyprus than in Iceland. In the 2018 electoral manifesto, the 
President did not make a single reference to any of the policies of accountability deployed 
during his time in office.  
In sum, in Cyprus, the bail-in to save banks from a total collapse and the resulting 
capital controls generated popular demands for accountability. Yet the political appetite for 
retribution was curbed by the fragility of the banking sector and the need to restore 
confidence in its institutions. As such, Cyprus is a “crucial” case: despite the debilitated state 
of the banking sector and growing public demands for accountability, stability and economic 
recovery were more important than accountability, even when it was expedient for the 
government to seek accountability.  
 
6. Alternative Explanations 
Although we have illustrated how the different levels of political desire for a proactive policy 
of accountability in Cyprus and Iceland interacted with the conditions of their respective 
banking industries, there are limitations in the extent to which we can find conclusive 
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evidence through process tracing in cases like Cyprus where “the dog did not bark.” So to 
increase confidence in our argument, we should consider other plausible hypotheses that 
could account for variations in politicians’ responses. These include the electoral cycle, the 
electoral/political system, and party ideology.  
 The level of incumbent culpability may shape politicians’ responsiveness to popular 
demands for accountability, and a common concern in times of crisis is to deflect blame.63 
Those in power in the period leading up to crisis might be concerned about the inconvenient 
facts that a criminal investigation could unearth, such as regulatory failures or omissions. In 
contrast, a new party in government, with limited previous exposure to power and no part in 
the crisis, might be more interested in investigating the causes (as their predecessors might 
be found culpable) and holding bank executives accountable.  
In Iceland, the decision to set up a special commission of inquiry on the roots of the 
crisis was taken by the center-right Independence Party seen as the architect of “Viking 
Capitalism” and as responsible for (the mismanagement of) the crisis. If blame avoidance 
were the chief concern, the Independence Party would have been the least enthusiastic 
supporter of retributive justice, not the party setting it in motion. In Cyprus, the newly 
elected conservative government that came to power in 2013 after a decade in opposition 
with limited responsibility for the creation of the crisis should have endorsed policies of 
accountability, seeking to heap blame on their predecessors. Yet mindful of the adverse 
consequences of prosecutions on the stability of the banking sector and the broader 
economic recovery, it decided to downplay the justice discourse. Overall, then, this 
hypothesis fails to explain why even though both countries examined here experienced a 
 
63 Boin, Arjen, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. The politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure. 
Cambridge University Press, 2016.; Hood, Christopher. The blame game: Spin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in 
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change in government and saw the emergence of new parties with limited pre-crisis exposure 
to power, only one was interested in retribution.  
We could also point to the degree of influence business (in this case, banking) has on 
the policymaking processes. The literature shows how the proximity of bankers to 
policymakers and the structural power they can leverage determine the nature of bail-in/out 
in times of crisis.64 An important literature on the “financialization of the economy”65  has 
theorized how the structural power of the financial industry has further been enhanced by 
the increase in the size of financial industry and its centrality within the business community 
since the 1970s.66  From this perspective, it could be argued that banks’ level of political 
influence and structural power may also affect how keenly politicians seek retribution.  
Although obviously relevant, the structural power of bankers and the banks’ 
institutional relations with the state are not fixed and linear, and the balance of power may 
be significantly affected by the impact of the crisis. For instance, the structural importance of 
the financial industry in the economy has in many cases been a poor predictor of the 
stringency of the regulatory requirements imposed by different governments after the global 
financial crisis.67 As a result, the level of political influence of bankers before the crisis does 
not necessarily predict politicians’ appetite for retribution. As we have pointed out, Cyprus 
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and Iceland followed a similar pre-crisis developmental model that relied on a 
disproportionate expansion of the financial sector. Financial actors accrued significant 
political influence in both countries in the years before the crisis. Yet the impact of the crisis 
affected the relationship/power of bankers differently in the two countries, with a sharp 
desire for political retribution seen only in Iceland.  
A third explanation focuses on the role of party ideology. Parties ideologically 
aligned with the financial industry, often on the right of the political spectrum, are less likely 
to promote policies favoring the prosecution of bankers than parties whose ideology is 
antagonistic to finance. Although this could explain the meager response of the Cypriot 
center-right DISY party – traditionally seen as close to the banking industry - it fails to 
account for the decision of its counterpart in Iceland, the pro-banking Independence Party, 
to design a proactive agenda of accountability that included criminal investigation.68 As the 
mastermind of the Viking Capitalist venture, the Independence Party was the least likely 
candidate to investigate bank executives. Hence, this hypothesis can explain the new 
government’s (social-democrats) continued support for policies of accountability but not the 
original decision to put this issue on the political agenda. After the 2008 Crash, it seems 
ideology lost relevance.  
Finally, political culture may be a factor in retribution. We would expect that 
politicians in countries with perception of widespread corruption (even in the period 
preceding the crisis) would be less inclined to pursue policies of retribution, as transparency 
may expose inconvenient truths about their own potential misconduct. This is the case of 
Cyprus where the very government which did not pursue pro-accountability policies is 
 
68 We acknowledge that DISY and the Independence Party are quite different species and that accountability 
has been more salient in the Icelandic case, yet we show that this is not sufficient reason to explain the 
divergent outcomes.  
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largely accused by domestic NGOs and international organizations for high-levels of alleged 
corruption;69 this perception of widespread corruption may affect how politicians deal with 
accountability as they may be reluctant to deploy investigative mechanisms that may expose 
their own wrongdoing. Besides, political culture of silence there is limited public expectation 
that the incumbent respond to public calls for a criminal investigation. On the contrary, in 
countries like Iceland where pre-crisis levels of trust in institutions were high, the degree of 
responsiveness to popular calls for justice should be higher. As we show in the analysis, this 
is true to some extent, as evident by the decision of the party (most) responsible for the 
crisis to adopt a pro-accountability agenda, as well as the strong cross-party consensus. Yet 
we are not in a position to determine whether political culture could have triggered this 
outcome if it were not for the unique impact of the crisis on the banking sector. In fact, 
other Nordic countries with similar high integrity and levels of trust in institutions did not 
pursue a similar policy of retribution after the crisis in the 1980s (Sweden, Finland) or after 
2008 (Denmark). The role of political culture in shaping political responses requires further 
attention but it does not seem to be the most crucial causal factor. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper sheds light on how politics shape the extent to which bank executives are held 
accountable after a financial crisis. Politicians can influence the likelihood of investigations 
and prosecutions of bank executives in various ways, such as establishing novel prosecutorial 
authorities tasked to document white-collar crimes related to the crisis and creating fact-
finding commissions subjecting bank executives’ actions to public scrutiny. They can 
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facilitate the work of prosecutorial authorities by providing resources, manpower, and 
(forensic/technological) expertise. They can also amend the legislative framework to 
facilitate prosecutors’ access to (incriminatory) evidence.  
In our examination of the different reactions to the recent financial crisis in two 
European countries, we have identified the demand from voters and the impact of the crisis 
on the banking institutions as crucial explanatory factors. In particular, in crises marked by 
the collapse of the banking sector, the potential systemic or reputational risks associated with 
criminal investigations are minimal, as banks are already inoperative, making it easier for 
politicians to accommodate the high public demand for accountability. In negotiated crises, 
where the government intervenes to prevent the collapse of banking institutions (bailout-
bail-in), the impact of voters’ demands is mitigated by concerns about the impact 
investigations could have on the stability of a weakened financial system; this could 
unnecessarily prolong the crisis and incur further political costs for those in power.  
 Although we have taken the first step towards explaining differences across countries 
in the promotion of accountability after a crisis, we have only compared two countries: 
Iceland and Cyprus. The similar background conditions of the two countries and the 
different conditions of the banking industry after the crisis make this choice appropriate to 
develop our argument. At the same time, future research should probe the generalizability of 
our theoretical framework by exploring cases with different background conditions, 
including bigger economies with no external supervision. In particular, while both Cyprus 
and Iceland both experienced severe crises that directly affected the livelihood of citizens 
such as capital controls and depositors’ haircuts and triggered mass protests, our case 
selection does not allow us to explore to what extent politicians embark on an agenda of 
accountability in the absence of these dynamics.  
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For instance, further work could explore why other larger European countries and 
the US did not embrace a more proactive agenda of accountability, despite the emergence of 
protest movements demanding justice (e.g. Occupy Movement in the US or Indignados in 
Southern Europe). Further work could also draw on historical cases to understand the 
origins of the demand for retribution after a crisis.  One example is the reluctance of US 
authorities to promote accountability after Lehman vs. the aftermath of the saving and loans 
crisis in the 1980s/1990s when hundreds of individuals were prosecuted.70 Our framework 
suggests the de facto collapse of hundreds of institutions in the latter example, coupled with 
the limited “systemic” impact on the global financial system, made it more likely to see a 
retributive policy than the 2008 crisis.  
Further research is needed to explore the impact of the dynamics theorized in this 
paper on a broader range of policies beyond those aimed at facilitating the investigation and 
prosecution of individuals. There is a significant body of research on corporate prosecutions 
and other forms of corporate sanctions, as they are the most frequent and easy forms of 
punishment.71 More work is also needed to understand the extent to which the conditions of 
the banking industry in the aftermath of crisis constrain the appetite for accountability 
policies targeting financial institutions or other forms of regulatory policies. 
Finally, we have focused on explaining the variations in the political responsiveness 
to calls for retribution, not the impact of the policies of accountability per se. We need to 
understand the short-term consequences of these policies on the initiation and outcome of 
actual criminal investigations, as well as their long-term consequences. As crises are 
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opportunities for learning from past failures and, as such, represent “critical junctures,” 
decisions made in response to a crisis can have a lasting impact on national institutions. For 
example, the OSP in Iceland was converted into a permanent prosecutorial authority to deal 
with corporate crimes. The expertise developed in the process of investigating cases related 
to the recent crisis and the “institutional memory” of its members created one of the most 
knowledgeable and well-trained prosecutorial bodies in Europe. As a result, Iceland has the 
institutional capacity to investigate white-collar crimes, arguably protecting it from a similar 
crisis in the future. Meanwhile, the half-hearted political response in Cyprus led to smaller 
changes, and an opportunity was lost. Taken together, these case studies suggest political 
responses can lead to important institutional legacies, but more work is required to 
understand the long-term consequences of the decision to pursue accountability. 
 
 
